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ADVERSE POSSESSION--COMPROMISES AND ESTOPPEL
Colchester Borough Council v. Smith [1992] 2 W.L.R. 728 is still a
truly remarkable decision. In the High Court last year, Mr. Tillson
was denied title to land by adverse possession because he had
concluded a written agreement acknowledging the council's paper
title, albeit that this agreement had been concluded more than
12 years after adverse possession had commenced (see [1991] C.L.J.
234). Under the Limitation Act 1980, s. 29(7), the expiry of 12 years
should have extinguished the council's title and made the written
acknowledgment ineffective, see Nicholson v. England [1926] 2 K.B.
93. Ferris J. thought otherwise and Mr. Tillson appealed. Now, by
what appears to be a wholly inappropriate analogy, the Court of
Appeal has dismissed the appeal.
In the Court of Appeal, although counsel for Colchester reserved
his position on certain matters, the case proceeded on the basis that
Tillson had indeed completed 12 years' adverse possession prior to
the written agreement by which he purportedly accepted the land
under a lease. There were no disputed facts. However, all of their
Lordships took the view that, because Tillson had entered into the
agreement freely, with legal advice and as a result of negotiations
that began before the 12 year period had ended, he was bound by a
bona fide compromise of a dispute from which he could not later
escape. Their authority for this was Binder v. Alachouzos [19721
2 Q.B. 151. In that case, the defendant had agreed in a written
compromise with his creditors not to raise a defence under the
Moneylenders Acts in any future suit over the monies owed. When
the defence was raised in an action for monies due under the
compromise, the court upheld the agreement and struck out the
defence on the basis that the policy behind the Moneylenders Acts
was not negated in that instance by the inter partes agreement. Using
this as their only authority, and not even attempting to distinguish
Nicholson, their Lordships sent Mr. Tillson away with his tenancy
but not his freehold.
Unfortunately, however, this reasoning is not compelling. First,
as Dillon L.J. himself points out, Binder is authority for the
proposition that a court may uphold a bona fide compromise of fact,
even if it appears to be contrary to the motivation behind an Act of
Parliament. In Binder, the defendant was forced to stand by his
acknowledgment that his creditors were not unregistered within the
meaning of the Moneylenders Acts, even though those Acts were
designed to prevent unregistered moneylending. He had bound
himself to an assumed state of facts and could not escape. However,
the Smith case is not about a compromise of fact; it is about a
purported agreement ousting a rule of law, i.e. that after 12 years of
adverse possession the title of the freeholder is extinguished. If, as
the Court of Appeal accepted, Tillson had completed 12 years,
the factual element in adverse possession was satisfied. The only
remaining question concerned the operation of statute, and this is
still a question of law, just as it was when it was ignored in the High
Court.
Secondly, even if it is accepted that in principle a bona fide
compromise of a question of law between two parties can take
precedence over a statute, where is the pressing policy reason that
requires it in cases such as this? Is it really the case that the Limitation
Act is to be disregarded because, to use Butler-Sloss L.J.'s citation from
Binder, "Any other course would cause very great difficulty in the
administration of justice"? This is all very well if property law is a
species of the law of contract. If it were, the adventurous tenant could
contract out of the Rent Acts and the relaxed lessee could waive his
right to a "section 146 notice" in the event of forfeiture. Yet, property
law is not an arm of contract law; freedom of contract does not oust the
need for clear, certain and predictable rules. Indeed, perhaps the most
disturbing feature of this case is not that Mr. Tillson was denied title-at
least he will have the benefit of a tenancy protected under the
Agricultural Holdings Act 1948-nor even that Smith sets an unwelcome
precedent-we can limit it to cases where the negotiations leading to the
written acknowledgment began before the 12 year period expired and
where there was full legal advice for the adverse possessor. It is rather
that fundamental principles of the law of real property (even those
which are statutory) can be disregarded in favour of freedom of contract
without any compelling analysis of principle or policy. Hard cases are
still making bad law.
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